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During the crisis of 2007-2008, many banks had to improve their management
because their previous models could not cope with the increase in the number
of defaults on mortgage loans and new risks produced by credit derivatives.
The goal of this study is to define what factors were the most significant deter-
minants of the stability of large banks of Europe during the crisis of 2007-2008.
This study concentrates mostly on the indicators of the management of loan
portfolio in major banks of Europe. For this purpose, the thesis uses a bal-
anced panel data of 69 banks in 18 largest European countries during 2006-2009.
Furthermore, from the results of tests on the significance of used variables, the
model that evaluates the distance from the insolvency for banks is constructed.
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Topic characteristics During the crisis of 2007-2008, many banks had to im-
prove their management because their previous models could not cope with the
increase in the number of defaults on mortgage loans and new risks produced
by credit derivatives. The goal of this study is to define what factors were the
most significant determinants of the stability of large banks of Europe during
the crisis of 2007-2008. This study concentrates mostly on the indicators of the
management of loan portfolio in major banks of Europe. For this purpose, the
thesis uses a balanced panel data of 69 banks in 18 largest European countries
during 2006-2009. Furthermore, from the results of tests on the significance of
used variables, the model that evaluates the distance from the insolvency for
banks is constructed.
Hypotheses Firstly, we want to determine what financial indicators were the
most significant for the stability of banks during the crisis. Secondly, we ex-
amine if the indicators of the management of loan portfolio affect significantly
the stability of banks. Finally, we compare European banks’ stability across
the EU countries in the sample.
Methodology For our analysis, we take a balanced panel data of 69 large
banks in 18 largest European countries during 2006-2009. To narrow our data
sample to only large banks, the logarithm of total assets is used as an indicator
of the size of the banks. To estimate the stability of these banks, we calculate
Z-scores. Then we run several regressions to analyze what factors of banking
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In the banking business, one thing that is vital is to find the balance between
the risks a bank faces and the profits it seeks to earn. Managing risks for a
bank is one of the most important and challenging tasks. Nevertheless, efficient
management of the risks does not always guarantee that a bank will be able to
avoid losses. Successful operation of banks requires the efficient management
of capital as well. After the global financial crisis had occurred, banks needed
to improve their systems of management.
This paper aims to determine what were the main factors influencing banks'
stability during the global financial crisis. After the world financial crisis,
managers in banks realized how important it is to manage the credit risks.
Therefore, it might be interesting to see how strongly the relationship between
banks' stability and the quality of loan portfolio management was during the
crisis. Though apart from credit risks banks needed to manage other bank-
ing factors, such as liquidity, capital, operational risks, business risks, systemic
risks and a lot more, this paper focuses mainly on loan portfolio management.
The thesis is organised as follows. In the first section, the literature review
describes the impact of the global financial crisis on European banks. Addi-
tionally, we describe the most important indicators of banking management
and the methods to analyze banking stability. Then the literature review ex-
plains methods to manage loan portfolio efficiently and impacts of bank specific
characteristics. In the second section, methods for creating panel data regres-
sion are used and described. Then we describe our data sample and the sources
that provided us with the data. Finally, the paper explains and describes the
results of the regressions created.
We test the variables that indicate the quality of loan portfolio management.
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The primary purpose of these tests is to see whether the hypothesis of their
significance holds during the crisis. From the results of the econometric regres-
sion, we conclude what factors of loan portfolio management were crucial to
managing during the crisis.Additionally, we compare European banks' stabil-
ity across the EU countries in the sample. In order to do this, we use Z-score,
which is negatively related to the probability of bankruptcy. Finally, we create
the model that includes all significant variables from the previous regressions.
This model evaluates the distance from the insolvency for banks in the sample,
controlling only significant factors.
To estimate the model empirically, we take a data set of 76 the largest banks
in 18 European countries. The thesis analyzes the stability of these banks from
2006 till 2009, as apart from the beginning of the crisis (2007-2008), we want
to take into account pre-crisis period (2006) and first results of the activity of
banks after the start of the crisis (2009). The banks are considered largest by
analyzing their total assets in the pre-crisis period (2006).
This thesis contributes to the area of studies of key variables that influence
the banking stability. The study of the factors that were significant for big
European banks to decrease the probability of bankruptcy can help in future
to avoid the big number of bankruptcies in the case of new global crisis. Fur-
thermore, the results of the comparison of the stability of banking sector in
different European countries can induce researchers to analyze in future how
the decisions of the authorities influenced the banking sector in different coun-
tries.
The results of this thesis show that loan portfolio management indicators had
a significant effect on the banking stability during the crisis. Furthermore, we
find that all country variables used are significant for Z-scores of banks. Fi-
nally, the model provided us with results that the fact whether a bank is listed
or not and the specialization of banks have significant effects on their stability
in the conditions of the crisis.
Chapter 2
Motivation and literature review
2.1 The impact of global financial crisis on Euro-
pean banks
The global financial crisis started in 2007 in the United States of America and
dramatically influenced the economy of the European Union. Though the crisis
originally started in the USA, there are pieces of evidence that it has a longer
impact on European banks than on US banks. Schildbach and Wenze (2013)
discuss why European banking has never reached the level of the profitability
that they had before the crisis. While US banks now have stable and even
greater profits than they used to have in the pre-crisis period. The authors
say that there are three main reasons for this. Firstly, the fact that US banks
possessed larger capital than European banks before the crisis started. A large
amount of capital helped US banks to recover quicker. Secondly, the real econ-
omy of the USA is considered to be more develeraging and easier adaptable to
the market conditions. Last reason described is that the European Union has
the problem of the weakness of central institutions. This issue exists because
member states have different interests.
Additionally, Weigand (2015) claims that European banking system is much
less developed in the post-crisis period than US one. This paper shows that
European banks have earned fewer stock returns since the start of the crisis.
Moreover, the author claims that European banks still experience negative rev-
enue, an increasing number of impaired loans and negative loan growth. Terazi
and Senel (2010) claim that after the start of the crisis many EU countries
began to experience high debt ratio. Moreover, Hungary, Romania, and Latvia
were affected so strongly by the crisis that they needed external financial help.
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In contrast, Delia (2012) asserts that European banks, especially in Western
Europe, succeeded in increasing their earnings during the crisis. The author
says that this increase was caused by both efficient and fast decisions of the
authorities and the volatility of emergent market.
From the literature described above, we can conclude that though the opinions
of economists differ about the influence of the crisis on European banks, it is
evident that the crisis that had started in the USA had a strong impact on the
European economy and banking.
Because of the crisis, the authorities in Europe had to strengthen the regulation
of the banking sector in Europe. Black et al. (2016) claim that the crisis during
2007-2009 in Europe led to an increase of regulation of the banking sector in
Europe. European banks need to satisfy the norms of these regulations. For
instance, one of such regulations was the increase of required minimum Tier 1
ratio for banks from 4% demanded by Basel II to 6%.
2.2 Methods to analyze the stability of banks
Different approaches throughout the literature help to create the analyses of the
stability of banks. In the literature, one of the most popular ways to analyze the
probability of bankruptcy is using Z-score. (Lepetit and Strobel, 2014). The
usage of Z-score is so popular because it is negatively related to the probability
of insolvency of banks. Therefore, the higher Z-score is, the stronger the bank
is. Usually to estimate Z-score economists use a bank capital asset ratio and
its return on assets. Return on assets (ROA) shows the profitability of the firm
compared to its total assets, while Capital asset ratio describes if the firm has
enough capital to support its assets. Additionally, Altman created his formula,
known as Altman Z-score formula, which takes into account five key financial
indicators by firms to estimate Z-score. These indicators are reported annually.
Another method to analyze the stability of banks is the accounting approach.
If economists want to analyze the stability of banks using this method, they
use the data from the balance sheet of banks. As well as, it is common to use
econometrics techniques to estimate if a bank operates successfully. (Kumbirai
and Webb, 2010). Apart from analyzing balance sheets and income statements,
it is crucial to monitor cash-flow statements.
The indicators that are commonly used to analyze banks' stability can be
divided into five groups:
- Capital adequacy indicators
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- Indicators of liquidity
- Indicators that show the quality of assets
- Indicators of quality of liabilities
- Profitability indicators
There is a big amount of ratios that economists use as those indicators. Firstly,
when researchers want to estimate the capital adequacy of a bank, they usually
use capital adequacy ratio (CAR). This ratio determines how well a bank can
meet its obligations relatively to its exposure to risk. It protects depositors
and other lenders. As in the case of insolvency of a bank, a bank's capital is
used to return depositors their money. Therefore, the higher this ratio is, the






Where CAR - capital adequacy ratio; TIER1 - Tier 1 capital; TIER2 - Tier 2
capital; RWA - risk weighted assets.
Tier 1 capital represents the capital adequacy of a bank. It is necessary
capital that involves equity capital and disclosed reserves. Tier 1 capital is
considered to be the best form of capital of a bank. Tier 2 capital includes
hybrid capital instruments, loan-loss and revaluation reserves as well undis-
closed reserves. Additionally, there exists Tier 1 capital ratio that shows the
comparison of risk-weighted assets and equity capital. Well-capitalized firms
have this ratio equal or larger than 6%.
As, after the crisis occurred, the minimum Tier 1 ratio increased to 6%, the
economists started to use it a lot in the literature while analyzing the banking
stability and performance. For instance, Berger and Bouwman (2013) use this
ratio to examine the influence of capital on the performance of banks during
financial crises. Their results show that Tier 1 ratio has a significant positive
effect on survival of small, normal and large banks during financial crises. How-
ever, the impact of Tier ratio is stronger for small banks than for large ones.
Compared to the conditions of financial crises, during normal times there is no
significant effect on the stability of banks.
Secondly, the analysis of liquidity indicators uses the liquidity coverage ratio
(LCR). This ratio represents one of stress tests that examines if a bank has
enough high-quality assets to survive one month full of stressed liquidity con-
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ditions. In Basel III it is written that even though some banks were managing
their capital efficiently and had high CAR in 2007-2009, they experienced prob-
lems since that they did not pay a lot of attention to their liquidity during the
crisis. Angelini et al. (2015) while analyzing Basel III impact on the economy
use LCR as liquidity indicator.
Instead of LCR, some papers use the ratio of total loans to total deposits
(LTD) as an indicator of liquidity of banks. For example, Shingjergji and
Hyseni (2015) use LTD as liquidity indicator for their model that analyzes
CAR in Albania. When the ratio is very high, there is a danger that a bank
will not be able to meet its obligations and return to depositors their money
in the case of crisis. This ratio is very often used by insurance companies to
estimate the price for insurance for banks.
Thirdly, one of the indicators of the quality of assets is the number of
impaired loans compared to the number of total loans. Samad (2004) uses this
ratio as an indicator of asset quality to analyze the performance of Islamic banks
in Bahrain. Due to the fact that the more impaired loans a bank has, the more
the quality of its assets worsen. The amount of non-performing loans evaluates
the quality of loan portfolio. Furthermore, the ratio of loan impairment charges
yearly to total assets is often used to analyze the quality of assets. The loan
growth is also informative about the assets quality. Ongore and Kusa (2013)
use this ratio in their analysis of the performance of Kenyan commercial banks.
If the loan growth higher than the market average by 20-25%, it may imply
that a bank experiences problems with a quality of its assets. There are some
reasons for this. First reason is that if a bank supplies substantially more loans
than an average norm, it is very doubtful that it has enough labor force to
monitor well its borrowers. The second one is that usually when the growth of
loans increases too much, the ratio of impaired loans to total loans increases
as well. Last reason is that after a new pool of loans is created, it takes a
long time for a portion of this pool to become impaired. Therefore, a bank
continues to provide its borrowers with new loans, though it may bring even
more problems.
Fourthly, the analysis of liabilities of a bank can be done with a help of debt
ratio that is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. This ratio provides the
comprehensive analysis of how much debt a bank has. The higher this ratio
is, the more risks a bank is considered to have. Additionally, high debt ratio
means that a bank is highly leveraged. When a bank uses borrowed money a
lot, its debt increases. And there can come a moment when a bank will have
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too much debt compared to its assets. Therefore, a bank will not be able to
meet its obligations. Moreover, when debt ratio is very high, depositors and
lenders are afraid to give their money to a bank, as there is a chance that they
will not get their money back in the case of insolvency. As a result, banks with
too high financial leverage loose potential additional capital. Nevertheless, it
is important to have a balance in this ratio. As when it is too low, a bank loses
an opportunity to earn profits that financial leverage can provide.
Last but not least, there are a lot of profitability indicators that are used
to analyze the performance of banks. Two of the most famous are return on
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA can be seen as an indicator of
the efficiency of management in a bank. It is calculated by dividing net profit
(NP) after taxes by an average value of total assets. Sometimes economists use
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as nominator instead of NP. ROE
is the ratio of net income to total equity. It shows the level of profitability
of investments of shareholders. Moreover, it can help to take a decision for
investors whether it is a good idea to continue investing their money into this
bank. Both ROE and ROA have a strong influence on the prices of shares
of banks in the market. Therefore, managers pay a lot of attention to these
indicators. In addition to ROE and ROA, some papers use other indicators.
For example, Caruntu and Romanescu (2008) use such ratios as the profit rate
that net profit divided by total income and the margin of assets utilization that
is the ratio of total incomes divided by total assets. But mostly researchers
use only these two indicators, as they are considered to be the most accurate
ones. Some papers use adjusted versions of ROE and ROA, for instance, PwC
International Limited while publishing their yearly financial statement, apart
from using ROE and ROA, use these indicators adjusted for risks.
2.3 The influence of country variables on banking
stability
When economists want to analyze the stability of banks, they usually take into
account macro variables, because the overall economy of a country has a big ef-
fect on the probability of insolvency and performances of financial institutions
in this country. The opportunities for banks in the market depend on vari-
ous factors. These factors are – the direction of development of the national
economy, the structure of government, the level of strength of regulations of
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commercial banks by national banks, the system of law in a country, balance of
payments of a country, foreign reserves, rate of inflation, interest rate, house-
hold incomes, GDP growth, the level of competition among banks in a country
and a lot more.
In the literature, there are a lot of papers that show how strongly macro
conditions of countries influence their financial institutions. For example, Pan
and Pan (2014) create the analysis of the dependence of profitability of com-
mercial banks on macro factors in China. They estimate the model where ROA
is a dependent variable, and macro factors are independent variables. These
factors are the rate of inflation, GDP, interest rates, money supply growth and
total market capitalization of stock.
Gizycki (2001) takes as explanatory factors GDP growth, the share of in-
terest in household income, real credit growth, inflation rate and share of con-
struction in GDP to analyze banks′ risks and profitability. Liang and Reichert
(2006) also focus their study on the impact of economic growth on the bank-
ing sector development. To compare, Bucur and Dragomirescu (2014) create a
research of influence of macro variables on credit risks of banks specifically.
Gocer (2013) studies the effect of the unemployment rate on bank loans.
National Bank of Romania created the analysis in 2008 of the relationship
between the unemployment rate and the development of banking sector in
Romania. If the unemployment rate is high, people do not have enough money
to deposit them in banks, and there is a danger that of a big number of default
of loans. Therefore, unemployment is considered to be important to control
while studying the factors of banks profitability.
The use of macroeconomic indicators is based on the assumption that the
reliability of banks depends on cyclically varying external conditions.The de-
crease in the stability of European banks during the crisis is strongly determined
by the changes in macroeconomic conditions in Europe because of the global
financial crisis. Due to this fact, to the factors that identify the characteristics
of management and quality of the financial policy of banks are often added
the macro indicators. The global financial crisis led to the decrease in GDP
growth in Europe. The graph 2.1 shows the average GDP growth percentage
change from the previous period in Eurozone and United Kingdom from 2005
till 2012. The countries that are taken into account are – Belgium, Germany,
Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, and the United
Kingdom. We can see that in 2007 GDP growth started to fall and in 2009 it
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reached the lowest point. However, in 2010 it began to increase.
Figure 2.1: GDP growth
Therefore, we can observe that the crisis influenced the economic growth
in Europe dramatically . The banks needed to react, as it could lead to their
defaults due to the fact that banking risks increase, when the economy worsens.
2.4 Methods to manage loan portfolio
From the methods described above how to analyze the stability of banks, it is
clear that loan portfolio management indicators are often used to analyze the
banking probability of insolvency. The efficient management of loan portfolio
is one if the key conditions of successful operation of a bank. Therefore, we
further describe the methods of management of credit risks that enable banks
to minimize them.
There are different approaches to the evaluation of credit risks, such as judg-
mental methods, expert systems, analytical models, statistical models, behav-
ioral models, and market models. The bank faces two choices - to provide the
2. Motivation and literature review 10
loan or refuse the loan. Brown (2008) say that there is ex-ante payoff of two
options: –Provide credit:
PV (Revenue−Costs)∗(1−p)−PV (Cost)∗TheProbabilityOfDefault (2.2)
(Where PV - portfolio value; Revenue - expected revenue from a loan; Cost
- expected costs of a loan; The probability of default - the probability that a
borrower will fail to meet his/her obligations)
or
– Refuse Credit: 0
The analysis of the creditworthiness of a borrower in banks is very complex. It
consists of some basic steps (Lobanova and Chugonova, 2008):
1) Analysis of justifications of a borrower that explain a need for a loan.
2) Analysis of financial reports of an enterprise, where primary attention is
paid to development potential and recent changes in activities of a company.
It helps to predict future perspectives of a company.
3) Analysis of preliminary financial statements.
4) Analysis of balance of payments and income to predict the ability of a bor-
rower to repay a loan and the probability of occurrence of delay of repayment.
5) Scenario analysis and evaluation of resistance of a borrower in case of ex-
treme unexpected changes in the economy.
6) Evaluation of the position of enterprise compared to its competitors on the
market.
7) Evaluation of the top management executives of the enterprise, their strate-
gies and performance, based on the gained results.
8) Drawing up a contract with agreed terms about liabilities and rights of a
borrower and a lender.
These steps allow a manager to estimate credit risks by analyzing the financial
position of an enterprise. This estimation includes analyzing the structure of
assets and liabilities, cash flow, financial stability, effectiveness of the company.
The assets are analyzed by considering of their liquidity. The bank also needs
to ensure that the liabilities are fully valued and appropriately disclosed. Addi-
tionally, to estimate the financial position of the firm, the banks use following
rational coefficients (Lobanova and Chugonova, 2008):
1. Current ratio - shows the ability of an enterprise to repay its short-term
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Where CA - current assets; CL – current liabilities.
2. Quick ratio shows the short-term liquidity of a firm. This ratio is the
indicator of the ability of an enterprise to meet its short-term obligations by
using its most liquid assets.
Quickratio =
(CAE +MS + AR)
CL
(2.4)
Where CAE - cash and equivalents; MS - marketable securities; AR - accounts
receivable; CL - current liabilities.






Where TL - total liabilities; TA - total assets.





Where NI - net income; NS - net sales.





Where SR - sales or revenues; TA - total assets.
6. Solvency ratio shows the ability of a firm to pay its debt and meet other





Where NPAT - net profit after tax; DEP - depreciation; TL - total liabilities.
7. Current debts to net worth ratio is the indicator that shows the financial
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Where CL - current liabilities; NW - net worth.





Where TL - total liabilities; TE - total equity.
Risk managers use these ratios to estimate the probability of a borrower to fail
to meet the obligations. They compare the values of the ratios with average
ones in the industry or normative ones as one of the tools to get proper results.
Then managers analyze the effectiveness of the work and competence of top
management of a firm, by considering the strategies they use and results they
achieve. The next step is to analyze the stability of the industry where a firm
operates. Last but not least is to analyze the country risk.
After conducting the analysis described above, it is possible to give a bor-
rower corresponding credit score by including a borrower to a particular risk
group. There are different credit agencies that created rating systems that
allow predicting the probability of default. The most leading rating agencies
are Standard Poor’s (SP), Moody’s and Fitch Group. The table (figure 5.1)1
shows the scales that these agencies use.
1https://www.cnb.cz/en/monetarypolicy/inflationreports/2011/2011IV/boxesandannexes/zoi2011IVbox2.html
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Figure 2.2: The scales of rating agencies
2.5 The impact of banks specific characteristics
on their stability
The specialization of banks tends to have an impact on their stability dur-
ing the crisis. Therefore, economists often control the specialization in their
models, when they analyze the stability and the performance of banks. For
instance, Stefancic (2016) create the analysis of Italian banks that showed that
the cooperative banks performed better during the crisis than the commercial
ones. The reason for this is that cooperative and commercial banks have dif-
ferent business models. Cooperative banks tend to be less exposed to credit
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risks than commercial ones. Additionally, the allocation policy of assets is more
efficient in cooperative banks than in commercial ones. The lending policies of
cooperative banks tend to be more provident. Finally, cooperative banks tend
to show lower cost-to-income ratio.
Manghetti (2011) compares in his study saving and commercial banks. It is
a common view of economists that saving banks to be less efficient, less stable
and less profitable than commercial ones. However, there are studies that
refute this view, because they do not find significant difference between the
performance of commercial and saving banks. The author claims that during
the crisis the profitability of saving banks was less than the profitability of
commercial ones. Nevertheless, the declining trend of the profitability is more
observable for commercial banks.
Apart from the specialization, there are economists that argue that the fact
if a bank was listed or not had an impact on the performance of banks during
the crisis. However, this impact is not clear. Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011)
create a study of main factors that influence the probability of banks, where
they control the effect of listing a bank in a stock exchange market. On the one
hand, the profitability of listed banks has to be higher, as there are shareholders
that coerce them to be more profitable. On the other hand, unlisted banks do
not have the costs of reporting and other requirements that listed banks have.
The effect of the size of a bank is also not clear. Adusei (2015) creates the
analysis of banking sector in Ghana, where he claims that the size of a bank
is positively related to its stability. The author explains it with the argument
that size is positively related to the volatility of returns. In contrast, Kasman
and Kasman (2016) argue exactly the opposite point of view. During their
analysis of the banking sector of Turkey, they conclude that size is negatively
related to the volatility of returns. Furthermore, De Nicolo (2000) claims that




To estimate the stability of the banks during the crisis, we count Z-scores for
the banks in our sample for four years: 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. Z-score
estimates the distance from the insolvency for banks. Z-score is negatively
related to the probability that the bank can go broke. Thus, the higher Z-score
is, the more stable and resistant the bank is. In order to find z-scores for the






ROA – return on assets
CAR – capital adequacy ratio
z – Z-score
σ(ROA) – standard deviation of return on assets
Z-score was very often used in the pre-crisis period to analyze the reliability of
the bank. However, it is better to use the logarithm of z, as Z-score is highly
skewed. For our sample, we calculate Z-scores for all banks for every year
from 2006 till 2009. The means of Z-score between years differ a lot. In 2006
the banks in the sample have a mean of 24,94 and in 2009 an average Z-score
decreased to 14,05 for the same sample of banks. This decline confirms that the
crisis influenced the stability of the banks dramatically. Figure 3.1 illustrates
the means of Z-scores during 2006-2009. We can observe that the mean of
Z-score started to decrease in 2007. The cause of this might be the occurrence
of the crisis. The probability of insolvency for the banks started to increase in
2007. As our primary goal is to analyze the influence of the indicators of loan
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portfolio management on banks' stability during the crisis, we take Z-score as
the dependent variable in our model.
Figure 3.1: Z-score
The independent variables are divided into three groups: the balance sheet
variables, the variables that show the overall state of the economy of the country
where the bank is located and banks specific dummies. For all the variables
that we have in percentage, we calculate logarithms. Summary statistics for
all variables is shown in the table A.1 in the appendix. Table A.2 provides the
description of all the variables used.
This study concentrates a lot on analyzing the management of loan portfolio
during the crisis. Therefore, from the balance sheet banking variables, the
first independent variable taken is the ratio of impaired loans to total loans
(IMPTOT) that allows us to estimate the quality of assets in the loan portfolio.
The higher this ratio is, the worse the position of the loan portfolio of a bank
is. And vice versa, when the ratio is low, it means that there is not a big
amount of non-performing loans compared to the total number of bank's loans.
Additionally, the growth of loans (GROWLOAN) is taken in order to find out
if it was important during the crisis to decrease the growth of loans to have
smaller credit risks for banks. Next independent variable examined is the ratio
of (LOADEP) customer loans to customer deposits, as Huang and Ratnovski
(2010) say that as investors have incentives to monitor banks accurately when
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wholesale funding is high, banks cannot afford to take too much risks. Also, we
take into account the ratio of total loans to total assets (LOANS). When this
ratio is high, the banks are considered to be riskier and more active in lending.
Nevertheless, usually these banks have less securitized assets that were highly
risky during the crisis, that is why it is hard to say for sure what the effect of
this ratio on Z-score is (Köhler, 2012).
To further analyze the risk of a portfolio, we use the ratio of risk-weighted as-
sets to total assets (RWA)(Kapan and Minoiu, 2013). The tier 1 ratio (TIER1)
is used to estimate the capital adequacy of the bank. Basel III demands that
tier 1 ratio has to be greater than 6 at all times to consider the bank as well-
capitalized. This ratio gives the opportunity to see the degree of influence of
efficient management of capital on the overall stability of banks (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury et al., 2012). In order to control the
investment practises as a factor of successful activity of banks, the variable
(NIM) which is net interest margin is included. The negative interest margin
may imply that the managers were taking inefficient decisions.
To control the effects of overall countries' economies, we use GDP (GDP) (Daly
et al., 2003) and average annual inflation (INFL) in the countries (Peng et al.,
2005). Moreover, to further analyze the difference in banks' stability because
of the location. The unemployment rate is used as an independent variable
(UNEMP) in the model. As, for example, in Romania research showed that
unemployment rate in the country played a crucial role for the performance of
Romanian credit institutions (National Bank of Romania, 2008).
Finally, we also want to see if there is any relationship between banks stability
during the crisis and whether the bank was listed, delisted or never listed at all.
For this purpose, dummy variable (UNLIST) and (DELIST) is used (Koöhler,
2012). We also include dummy variables (COMM) and (COOP), which con-
trol the effects of specialization of the bank in our model (Kapan, 2013). The
variable (SIZE) is created by taking the logarithm of the total assets of banks
to be able to define the largest banks in the countries in our sample in 2006.
3.1 Empirical model
Firstly, we create a model that includes only bank characteristics variables
that depend on the loan portfolio management. Thus, the regression is done
on independent variables – IMPTOT, GROWLOAN, LOADEP and LOANS.
The dependent variable is Z that is the logarithm of Z-score calculated above.
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= β0 + β1(IMPTOTi,t) + β2(GROWLOANi,t)
+β3(LOADEPi,t) + β4(LOANSi,t) + ui,t (3.2)
Where Z
i,t
- the logarithm of Z-score for bank i in a year t; IMPTOTi,t -
the logarithm of ratio of impaired loans to total loans; GROWLOANi,t - the
logarithm of growth of loans; LOADEPi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of total
loans to total deposits; LOANSi,t - the ratio of total loans to total assets; ui,t
- error term.
As the model uses panel data, we have to choose between different models. As
when we work with this type of data, we have three types of models: Pooled
OLS model, random effects model and fixed effects model. Therefore, first,
we test our model with a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, to choose
what is more appropriate to use OLS model or random effects model. If we
get results from LM test significant, random effects model is preferred to OLS
model. However, we still need to decide if random effects model is better than
fixed effects model. Though random effects estimator is considered to be more
efficient than fixed effects estimator, sometimes we lose consistency while using
random effects model.The Hausman test will indicate which of the models is
more appropriate to use. As panel data regression demands estimators be both
consistent and efficient, we need to be sure that our estimators satisfy these
assumptions. But consistency is even more important than efficiency.
To extend the analysis, other regressors that represent banks characteristics
are added to the model. In this model our explained variable is Z-score again.
The set of our independent variables is – IMPTOT, GROWLOAN, LOADEP,
LOANS, RWA, TIER 1, NIM, and SIZE.
Z
i,t
= β0 + β1(IMPTOTi,t) + β2(GROWLOANi,t)
+β3(LOADEPi,t) + β4(LOANSi,t) + β5(RWAi,t)
+β6(TIER1i,t) + β7(NIMi,t) + β8(SIZE) + ui,t (3.3)
Where Z
i,t
- the logarithm of Z-score for bank i in a year t; IMPTOTi,t -
the logarithm of ratio of impaired loans to total loans; GROWLOANi,t - the
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logarithm of the growth of loans; LOADEPi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of
total loans to total deposits; LOANSi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of total
loans to total assets; RWAi,t - the logarithm the ratio of risk-weighted assets
to total assets; TIER1i,t - logarithm of tier 1 ratio; NIMi,t -the logarithm of
net interest margin; SIZE - logarithm of total assets; ui,t - error term.
It might be also of interest to study the impact of macro variables on the




= β0 + β1(IMPTOTi,t) + β2(GROWLOANi,t) + β3(LOADEPi,t)
+β4(LOANSi,t) + β5(RWAi,t) + β6(TIER1i,t) + β7(NIMi,t)
+β8(SIZE) + β9(GDPi,t) + β10(INFLi,t) + β11(UNEMPi,t) + ui,t (3.4)
Where Z
i,t
- the logarithm of Z-score for bank i in a year t; IMPTOTi,t - the
logarithm of ratio of impaired loans to total loans; GROWLOANi,t - the loga-
rithm of the growth of loans; LOADEPi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of total
loans to total deposits; LOANSi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of total loans
to total assets; RWAi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to
total assets; TIER1i,t - the logarithm of tier 1 ratio; NIMi,t - the logarithm of
net interest margin; SIZE - logarithm of total assets; GDPi,t - the logarithm
of GDP growth; INFLi,t - the logarithm of the rate of inflation;UNEMPi,t -
the logarithm of unemployment rate; ui,t - error term
Then individual-specific effects are recovered to see how much individual val-
ues can be different from the ones predicted by the model. We recover these
individual-specific effects using the following formula
âi = Zi − x'iβ̂ (3.5)
Where ai - individual specific effects for a bank i; Zi - the mean of logarithm
Z-score; x'i - the means of regressors. So we are removing the times effects
from both the dependent variable and the independent variables.
After all, the countries are compared by the means of Z-score in order to
determine in which countries the banking sectors performed better during the
crisis than in other countries in the sample. And vice versa, the paper intends
to determine in which countries the banking sectors performed worse during
the crisis than in other countries in the sample.
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3.2 Data and sample description
This paper uses the data for 69 largest banks during the period of 2006-2009 in
18 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. The banks were
considered as largest by their total assets as of 2006. Due to the data unavail-
ability, the sample decreased from 100 largest banks to 69. The choice of the
number of years from 2006 till 2009 is made because we want to analyze the
dependence of banks' stability during the crisis (2008-2009) on their stability
in the pre-crisis period (2006-2007). The sources for the data are Bureau Van
Dijk's BankScope1database and the WorldBank 2. From the BankScope, the
data for bank characteristics is obtained. The WorldBank was used to collect
the data about macroeconomic variables for the countries where banks from
our dataset are located.
We have a balanced panel data, meaning that all banks have measurements for
all independent variables in all time periods. The panel data is considered to
be short, as there are a lot of entities (banks), but a few periods (4 years). Ad-
ditionally, panel data is fixed, as the same banks are observed for each period
in the data set.
Additionally, our data set can be divided in two ways. Firstly, there are three
different specializations of banks in the sample: commercial (51banks), saving
(10 banks) and cooperative (8 banks). Secondly, we can create groups based
on whether the banks were listed or not: delisted (10 banks), listed (30 banks)
and unlisted (29). Unlisted are those banks that were never listed at all. Table





4.1 Results of the regressions
The result of the first test taken – Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test
is the rejection of H0. This result means that random effects model is more
appropriate for this panel data, as p-value is small enough and we can reject H0.
The results are in the Appendix in Figure A.1. Then, Hausman test resulted
in p-value equal to 0.000. As a result, we can reject the null hypothesis again.
The results are shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix. In Hausman test the null
hypothesis is that both models - random and fixed are appropriate for the data
set. Therefore, we should use fixed effects model. The correlation between
the fixed effect ai and independent variables may cause biased estimators if
we do not take ai from the estimation. Eliminating of these biases is done by
fixed effects model and the first differencing. However, the first differencing
method works only for two-period panel data. As we have four periods, we
use fixed effect model. Fixed effect model allows the intercept to differ across
the banks, but to be the same over time. With this model, we can control
heterogeneity if it is constant over time, but is correlated with regressors. To
estimate fixed effects model, two regressions are run with LSDV estimator and
within estimator. They produce identical estimators. However, within model
gives us incorrect R2, therefore, we should use R2 from LSDV model. To cope
with perfect multicollinearity, LSDV1 approach is used. This approach drops
one dummy variable from the regression.
Our results show that average value of a is equal to 4.66851. Only GROWLOAN
that is the growth of loans is estimated to increase the value of Z. The β is equal
to 0.046. The model predicts that when the growth of loans increases by 1%,
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Z-score increase by 0.046%. Thus, the growth of loans influenced the stability
of big European banks positively during the crisis. The result is significant with
a 95% confidence, as p-value is 0.000. Thus, it is small enough to reject the
hypothesis that there is no influence of this regressor on the explained variable.
In contrast, IMPTOT, LOADEP and LOANS are considered to have neg-
ative effects on the banks profits during the crisis. IMPTOT (impaired loans
to total loans) is significant, as p-value is 0.000. A one percent increase in
the ratio of impaired loans to total loans is predicted to decrease Z-score by
0.227 percent by the model, holding all other variables constant. This is easily
predictable, as the more non-performing loans a bank has, the more losses it
experiences. Additionally, the model shows that LOADEP decreases Z-value
of banks. However, the result is not significant.The reason for this conclusion
is that p-value is greater than 0.05. Thus, we cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis that the estimator is equal to zero at the 0.05 level. Therefore, the ratio
between loans and deposits did not play an important role for banks' stability
during the crisis. The independent variable LOANS that is the ratio of total
loans to total assets is insignificant. Due to the fact that p-value is not small
enough to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we can conclude that from
the independent variables used in the model, only loan growth and the ratio of
impaired loans to total loans were important during the crisis. This importance
means that it was crucial for managers to analyze the borrowers accurately in
order not to let IMPTOT increase. Nevertheless, providing loans produced a
profit for banks, so an increase in the rate of growth of loans enabled them to
improve their stability. Doubtless, this was possible only with a condition of
efficient analysis of borrowers due to the fact that they had to avoid the appear-
ance of impaired loans. Therefore, the banks had to use methods to manage
credit risks described above in the literature in order not to let subprime lend-
ing happen. Both LSDV1 and within estimator provide identical estimates for
regressors. Therefore, it is concluded that data set does not have too many
observations for LSDV being not appropriate. In this case, it is better to use
LSDV1 approach, as it gives us correct R2, which is equal to 0.588. This means
that 59% of the variation in Z-score is explained by this model. And p-value
for F test is very small, that is why we can say that we can reject the null
hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the regressors in the model are equal
to zero. Both tables with LSDV(4.2) and within(4.1) provide the results. t
statistics in parentheses* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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To extend the analysis we add RWA, TIER 1, NIM, and SIZE to the model. Then
LSDV is run again. The R2 has increased to 0.785, therefore, adding new variables
increases the number of percents in the variation of Z-score that is explained by the
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model. The regressor IMPTOT is still significant, as p-value is small enough to reject
H0. Nevertheless, the influence of this independent variable is smaller now, as a one
percent increase in the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans is predicted to
decrease Z-score by 0.192 percent by the model, holding all other variables constant.
GROWLOAN is also significant, due to the fact that p-value is very small. But in
contrast to IMPTOT, after we control more variables, the model predicts that the
influence of the growth of loans on the stability of a bank becomes greater. Now 1%
increase in growth of loans leads to 0.072% increase in Z-score. While controlling
new variables, LOANS becomes significant because p-value is small enough to allow
us to reject the hypothesis that there is no significant influence of the ratio of total
loans to total assets on the stability of banks. The estimator is equal to -1.119, thus,
1% increase in LOANS results in 1,119% decrease in Z-score. Therefore, if there
are too many loans compared to bank's total assets, a bank's stability is predicted
to worsen. The explanatory variable LOADEP is still not significant, as we cannot
reject the null hypothesis at 0.05 level. Because p-value is too large. Additionally,
while analyzing newly added to the model variables, we can see that Tier 1 ratio is
predicted to increase Z-score. The p-value is very small. This is expected, as the
capital adequacy is high, a bank is considered to be more stable. A one percent
increase of Tier 1 ratio leads to 0.690 percent increase of Z-score. Also, net interest
margin has a positive estimator. However, the result is not significant, as p-value is
too big to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we can say that investment strategies
were not so important as the management of loan portfolio during the crisis in order
for a bank to be more stable. Furthermore, the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total
assets (RWA) is not significant. The p-value is not small enough to reject the null
hypothesis. The estimator is positive. Though the more capital bank holds to reduce
the risk of insolvency, the more chances it has to pay the debt. Higher RWA does
not cause significantly higher Z-score. In contrast to RWA, SIZE is the significant
independent variable, as p-value is small enough to reject H0. The model predicts
that larger size increases the probability of insolvency. This effect may be due to the
fact that large banks show higher levels of risk-taking (De Nicolo , 2000). Table 4.3
shows the results.
In order to control country variables, now GDP, UNEMP and INFL are added to
the model. The significance of previously described explanatory variables does not
change. R2 becomes slightly bigger (0.822). All country variables are significant, as
p-values are small enough to reject the null hypotheses. The rate of unemployment
tends to increase the probability of insolvency of a bank, thus, decrease Z-score. This
relationship is due to the fact that when the unemployment is high, the demand for
new loans is also high, but mostly these loans become non-performing.(National Bank
of Romania report, 2008) In addition, GDP growth has a positive income on Z-score.
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As GDP growth increases, when there is economic growth in a country. When the
economy prospers, the banking sector becomes more stable (Worldbank). Further-
more, a higher rate of inflation is predicted to increase Z-score. This relationship is
due to the fact that banks can make profits on higher inflation. As when prices rise,
people need more money, thus they want to borrow from banks. Moreover, there is
a view that inflation tends to encourage investment decisions of banks (Chioma et
al., 2014). Table 4.4 describes the results.
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Now we create the model that includes only significant variables from previous
regressions. Additionally, we want to control the specialization of banks, for this
purpose dummy variables – COMM and COOP are created. The base group includes
saving banks. LTDV regression is run again. The p-values are small enough to
consider the specialization of banks to be significant at 0.05 level. Therefore, we can
conclude that our model suggests that the specialization of banks had a substantial
effect on the probability of bankruptcy of banks in our sample during the crisis.
Commercial banks tend to have a higher Z-score than Saving banks, as predicted by
the model. The coefficient is positive – 0.461. Cooperative banks are predicted by
the model to have higher Z-scores than commercial ones. Furthermore, to control the
possible effect of the fact if the bank is listed. We add to dummy variables DELIST
and UNLIST to the model. The base group includes listed banks. The p-values
are small enough to conclude that the model allows considering these independent
variables as significant at 0.05 level. If a bank is unlisted, its Z-score is larger on
1.219% approximately than Z-score of a listed bank. While if a bank is delisted, its Z-
score is larger on 3.356% than Z-score of a listed one. This result let us conclude that
the model predicts that listed banks tend to have a higher probability of insolvency
than those that are unlisted and delisted. The R2 is 0.821. Therefore, the model
explains 82% of the variation of Z-score for banks in our sample. The final model is
Zi,t = β0 + β1(IMPTOTi,t) + β2(GROWLOANi,t)
+β3(LOANSi,t) + β4(TIER1i,t)
+β5(SIZEi) + β6(GDPi,t) + β7(UNEMPi.t)
+β8(INFLi) + δ9(COMMi,t) + δ10(COOPi.t) +δ11(DELISTi) + δ12(UNLISTi,t) + ui,t
Where Zi,t - the logarithm of Z-score for bank i in a year t; IMPTOTi,t - the
logarithm of ratio of impaired loans to total loans; GROWLOANi,t - the logarithm
of the growth of loans; LOANSi,t - the logarithm of the ratio of total loans to
total assets; TIER1i,t - the logarithm of tier 1 ratio; SIZE - logarithm of total
assets; GDPi,t - the logarithm of GDP growth; INFLi,t - the logarithm of the rate
of inflation;UNEMPi,t - the logarithm of unemployment rate; COMMi,t - dummy
variable for commercial banks; COOPi.t - dummy variable for cooperative banks;
DELISTi - dummy variable for delisted banks; UNLISTi,t - dummy variable for
never listed banks; ui,t - error term.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the final model. This model evaluates the distance
from the insolvency for banks (Z-score) in the sample, controlling only significant
factors.
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After running all the regressions, we want to recover individual specific effects.
For this purpose we use fixed effects estimator for the significant independent vari-
ables, we got from previous recessions. However, dummy variables that control the
specialization and the fact if a bank is listed are excluded. As fixed effects model
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does not allow to analyze dummy variables. Then formula 3.4 is used.
The results show that standard deviation of individual specific effects – alphafehat
is 1.167. The minimum of alphafehat is -2.818, the maximum is 2.341. This means
that individual specific effects increase Z-score maximally by 2.341 and decrease max-
imally by 2.818 from predicted by the model. Table 4.6 provides the summary of the
results. Table A.4 in the appendix shows the detailed overview of the results.
Table 4.6: Summary individual specific effects
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
alphafehat 0 1.167 -2.818 2.341
N 276
Finally, we compare the development of banking sector among countries in our
sample. To do this, we use Z score means. We intend to find in which countries
Z-score decreased the most and in which one the least. To do this, we calculate
Z-score means for the banking sector for each country in 2006 and 2009 years. Then
we subtract Z-score means 2009 from Z-score means 2006. The table A.5 in the
appendix provides the results. It can be observed that Belgium is the only country
in the sample in which banks have on average Z-score in 2009 higher than in 2006. In
contrast, the banking sectors in Greece and Ireland experienced more problems than
the banks in other countries in the sample during the crisis. Because their average
Z-scores decreased a lot.
4.2 Further discussion of the results
The model estimates that the explanatory variables, which indicate the quality of
loan portfolio management, are significant for the size of Z-score. The ratio of im-
paired loans to total loans (IMPTOT) is significant for the stability of the banking
sector in Europe, managers need to analyze the borrowers accurately. Because sub-
prime lending can lead to high losses for a bank, and, thus, lead to its bankruptcy.
The growth of loans is estimated to have a positive effect on Z-score. That is why
it is very important not only to use efficient models to evaluate the creditworthiness
of borrowers but also try to achieve a positive loan growth. The way to analyze
the ability of borrowers to repay loans is done through basic steps described in the
literature review.
The ratio of total loans to total assets affects Z-score severely. That is why it is
important for banks to find a point where the number of assets that are loans is such
that does not let liquidity problems appear. Their assets must be diversified by other
types of assets, such as reserves, investment securities, and physical assets. This is
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significant for banks in order to have a low probability of insolvency.
The model considers Tier 1 ratio as also the significant variable. Therefore, man-
agers in banks have to keep it high enough in order no to go broke. As managers
have to keep the capital high enough to let a bank operate successfully, they should
replenish the capital either with the help of external sources or internal sources. The
decision what sources to use should be made in response to the size of profit and
the conditions on the market. The conditions on the market determine how fast the
capital must be replenished.
The listing of banks is predicted to have a bad effect on Z-score. In Europe mostly
only very large banks are listed. The majority of European banks are unlisted. The
model shows that delisted banks tend to have a lower probability of the bankruptcy.
This may be caused by the fact that they have lower costs than the banks that are
listed. Despite the fact that they destroyed the value of shares. Additionally, the
results show that cooperative banks were the most successful during the crisis. The
difference in stability that is related to the difference in the specialization may occur
due to the fact that commercial, cooperative and saving banks have completely dif-
ferent business models. This may be due to the fact that cooperative banks are less
exposed to credit risks.
All country variables turned out to be significant for the size of Z-score of the banks.
Country variables cannot be regulated by banks, as only macro policies can have im-
pacts on them. Therefore, when we create the analysis that shows in which countries
the banking sector was the most stable and which one the least during the crisis,
we can conclude in which countries macro policies were more successful. Successful
macro policies mean that the government provides easy conditions for the banking
sector to operate efficiently. From analyzing Z-scores, we concluded that Belgium
was the only country in the sample where average Z-score for banks did not become
less in 2009 compared to the pre-crisis period. This result of the analysis means
that authorities responded well to the crisis. Therefore, it might be interesting to
analyze in future what decisions were made and what policies were implemented in
Belgium that it performed better than other EU countries. Additionally, it should
be interesting to study what were reasons for Greece and Ireland that made them
perform worse than all other countries in the sample.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The global financial crisis that started in 2007-2008 affected the whole world. The
number of bankruptcies of banks all over the world was increasing during those years.
Though the crisis appeared initially in the USA, there are pieces of evidence that
the impact of it on European banks was even larger than on US banks. Because
for European banks, it was harder to recover from the crisis. Furthermore, some
economists claim that European banks have never recovered fully after the crisis
appeared. Because of such a strong effect of the crisis, the managers in banks had
to improve their systems of management as fast as they could. The successful man-
agement during the crisis depended on the factors that were the most crucial for the
stability of the banking sector.
This thesis analyzes the role of bank management in the stability of large banks in
18 European countries during the period of 2006-2009. For the analysis, the sample
of 69 banks considered large by their total assets is taken. To estimate the stability
of banks, we calculate Z-score, which is the negatively related to the probability of
insolvency of banks. From the literature, we determine what factors are the most
frequently analyzed to evaluate the stability of banks by the economists. Mostly
the paper focuses on the indicators of loan portfolio management. Additionally, the
study takes into account country variables such as GDP growth, the rate of infla-
tion and unemployment rate. Furthermore, to control bank specific characteristics
– dummy variables that control the specialization of banks and the fact whether a
bank is listed or not are included. Then fixed effect model is used to analyze our
data.
One goal of this paper is to analyze what factors were significant to manage during
the crisis. The second goal is to examine if specifically loan portfolio management
indicators were significant for the stability of banks during the crisis. Finally, our
intention was to analyze in which country the banking sector had the highest and
the lowest stability during the crisis.
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In order to analyze what factors were significant for banking stability during the cri-
sis, we reviewed the literature. We included the independent variables that control
loan portfolio management, liquidity management, capital management and invest-
ment practices. Our first findings are that for the stability of large European banks
during the crisis, loan portfolio management indicators are significant. The ratio of
impaired loans to total loans is negatively related to Z-score, as the more impaired
loans a bank has, the more losses it experiences. However, the growth of loans has
a positive effect on Z-score. This is due to the fact that banks earn profits on loans,
whenever they perform. Therefore, it is important for managers in banks to have a
high growth of loans, but to analyze borrowers accurately to have these loans per-
forming. The ratio of total loans to total assets is estimated to decrease Z-score.
Therefore, though it is good to have a high growth of loans for banks, their assets
must be diversified by other types of assets, such as reserves, investment securities,
and physical assets.
Additionally, apart from loan portfolio management indicators, the size of banks and
Tier 1 ratio are significant for Z-score of banks, as estimated by our model. Size
has a positive relationship with their probability of insolvency. This may be caused
by the fact that large banks tend to show higher levels of risk-taking. In contrast,
the increase in Tier 1 ratio is estimated to reduce the probability of insolvency by
increasing Z-score. The cause for this relationship is that Tier 1 ratio shows the level
of capitalization of a bank. Well-capitalized banks are more stable than other banks.
Moreover, the study reveals that all country variables included in the model, such
as GDP growth, Unemployment rate and Inflation rate have significance effect on
the probability of insolvency of banks. Unemployment rate increases the probability
of bankruptcy of banks because of increasing number of non-performing loans. In
contrast, GDP growth, and Inflation rate improve the stability of banking sector. Be-
cause economic growth creates more opportunities for the banking sector to progress
and banks can earn profits on inflation.
Furthermore, the dummy bank specific variables included in the model are also sig-
nificant. We found that cooperative banks had the least probability of insolvency
during the crisis. The reason for this is that cooperative banks are considered less
risky than other types of banks. Additionally, unlisted and delisted banks tended to
be more stable during the crisis, as estimated by the model. The might be caused
by the fact that they have lower costs, as they do not have to pay for reporting and
other requirements.
Finally, we created the model that included all significant variables from the pre-
vious regressions. This model evaluates the distance from the insolvency for banks
(Z-score) by controlling only significant factors. This model explains 82% of the
variation of Z-score. Then, we analyzed the stability of banking sectors in different
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countries in our sample. Our results are that in Belgium banking sector was the
most stable, while in Ireland and Greece the least. This can induce future studies
about decisions of the governments that led to these results.
In the end, we would like to conclude that efficient systems of management in banks
are essential for their successful operation and stability. The management in banks
is a very complex issue that consists of many different factors and depends on the
conditions of the economy. The primary intention of this thesis was to analyze loan
portfolio management and its influence on the banking stability of European banks
during the global financial crisis.
Bibliography
Angelini, P., L. Clerc & L. CĂşrdia & V. Gambacorta& L. Gerali& A. Lo-
carno& A. Motto& R. Roeger& W. Van den Heuvel& S. VlÄŤek (2015):
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Table A.1: Summary statistics




year 2007.5 1.12 2006 2009 276
TotalCapitalRatio2006 12.409 7.033 7.140 88.900 276
ROA2006 0.618 0.76 -5.449 3.039 276
SDROA06 0.675 0.186 0.503 0.950 276
Z 20.623 12.486 8.302 162.061 276
LIQUI 0.189 0.126 0.003 0.828 276
LEVER 19.524 12.251 9.364 161.519 276
ROADV 1.099 1.22 -5.733 6.038 276
SIZE 17.697 1.661 13.553 21.513 276
NetInterestIncomeAverageEa 1.968 1.072 -0.08 6.97 276
IMPTOT 0.776 1.007 -5.116 3.074 276
LOADEP 4.94 0.392 3.776 5.98 276
NIM 0.53 0.618 -2.12 2.526 276
GROWLOAN 1.805 1.839 -4.163 4.518 276
LIST 0
SPEC 0
tier1 9.587 6.391 5.05 83.100 276
TIER1 2.186 0.321 1.619 4.42 276
LOANS 0.636 0.186 0.038 0.992 276
RWA 0.556 0.182 0.069 0.876 276
GDP 43708.604 18931.381 8999.74 96880.509 276
INFL 0.684 0.854 -2.337 2.347 276
UNEMP 1.783 0.383 0.916 2.625 276
banknum 35 19.953 1 69 276
z 2.944 0.363 2.117 5.088 276
est fixed 1 0 1 1 276
est random 1 0 1 1 276
res 2.944 0.39 2.057 6.029 276
est ols 1 0 1 1 276
est ols dum 1 0 1 1 276
countrynum 11.159 4.364 1 18 69
COMM 0.739 0.44 0 1 276
COOP 0.116 0.321 0 1 276
SAV 0.145 0.353 0 1 276
DELIST 0.145 0.353 0 1 276
LISTED 0.435 0.497 0 1 276
UNLIST 0.42 0.495 0 1 276
alphafehat 0 1.167 -2.818 2.341 276
A. Appendix III
Table A.2: Description of the variables
Variables Description
z logarithm of Z-score
IMPTOT logarithm of the ratio of impaired loans to total loans
GROWLOAN logarithm of growth of loans
LOADEP logarithm of the ratio of total assets to total deposits
LOANS logarithm of the ratio of total loans to total assets
TIER1 logarithm of Tier 1 ratio
SIZE logarithm of total assets
NIM logarithm of net interest margin
RWA logarithm of the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets
GDP logarithm of GDP growth
INFL logarithm of inflation rate
UNEMP logarithm of unemployment rate
COMM dummy variable if a bans is commercial
COOP dummy variable if a bank is cooperative
DELIST dummy variable if a bank is delisted
UNLIST dummy variable if a bank was never listed




listed delisted unlisted commercial saving cooperative
Austria 2 1 0 1 2 0 0
Belgium 3 0 0 3 2 1 0
Czech Republic 3 0 1 0 3 0 0
Denmark 6 5 0 1 6 0 0
Finland 3 0 1 4 2 2 1
France 4 0 2 4 3 0 1
Germany 3 3 0 0 3 0 0
Greece 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
Hungary 3 1 0 2 3 0 0
Ireland 3 1 1 1 3 0 0
Italy 7 4 0 3 2 0 5
Netherlands 4 0 0 4 3 0 1
Norway 7 5 2 1 3 5 0
Poland 2 2 0 0 2 0 0
Portugal 5 3 0 2 4 1 0
Sweden 3 3 0 0 2 1 0
Switherland 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
United Kingdom 9 0 2 7 9 0 0
Total 72 30 10 32 54 10 8
A. Appendix IV
Table A.4: Individual specific effects means for 4 years
banknum mean banknum mean
1 -.0256494 36 -1.061751
2 -.3116042 37 1.758617
3 1.268128 38 .4568818
4 -.4090922 39 1.927687
5 1.199938 40 -.7510849
6 -.3826129 41 -.4960299
7 -1.155776 42 -1.597696
8 -.3661287 43 -1.108759
9 .1438747 44 .7465461
10 -.3397425 45 -1.231604
11 .3520709 46 .3467127
12 .3490492 47 .6463647
13 -.0335703 48 -1.215458
14 -2.747089 49 -.7662646
15 -.3207464 50 .170613
16 -1.515645 51 -.387044
17 .119837 52 .0875859
18 -1.762416 53 .5122387
19 .5448247 54 1.21323
20 -.6670524 55 1.027556
21 .4064626 56 -.6338593
22 -2.817955 57 -.3783688
23 -.4870063 58 -.8733428
24 -1.058979 59 -1.706114
25 -1.080669 60 -.812421
26 2.056297 61 1.024842
27 1.57667 62 .9893865
28 -1.308034 63 -.5725744
29 -.6276267 64 2.111641
30 2.340973 65 .3096476
31 -.0212106 66 .4771047
32 1.43279 67 2.321115
33 1.704335 68 -.5465322
34 2.059698 69 -1.102748
35 .9975372 Total -5.51e-09
A. Appendix V
Table A.5: The difference between Z-scores in 2006 and in 2009
Countries Z-score 2006 Z-score 2009 the difference between 2006 and 2009
Austria 46.9 37.2 -9.76
Belgium 19.0 27.5 8.51
Czech Republic 24.2 16.3 -7.94
Denmark 27.4 16.2 -11.2
Finland 26.1 13.3 -12.8
France 20 12.9 -7.14
Germany 22 13.6 -8.41
Greece 34.1 12.8 -21.25
Hungary 21.3 13.7 -7.58
Ireland 23.2 8.7 -14.5
Italy 21.7 12.3 -9.7
Netherlands 25.5 12.8 -12.7
Norway 21.9 12.2 -9.71
Poland 26.3 12.1 -14.25
Portugal 27.4 14.3 -13.13
Sweden 21.9 14 -7.90
Switherland 30.4 20.7 -9.64
United Kingdom 30 16.3 -13.76
A. Appendix VI
Figure A.1: Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random
effects
A. Appendix VII
Figure A.2: Hausman test
